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This article provides an analysis of the normative framework for Spanish cannabis 
clubs by contextualising it within a growing body of comparative constitutional law 
that recognises legal obstructions to personal drug consumption as intrusions on the 
right to privacy. Article 3 (2) of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 relieves signatory states from 
the Article’s obligation to criminalise drug possession and cultivation for ‘personal 
consumption’ where doing so would conflict with the constitution or the basic concepts 
of their legal system.  Spain relied on Article 3(2) in its decision not to criminalise 
conduct for personal consumption.  The Spanish judiciary has had to consider the legal 
implications of collective consumption and cultivation in the form of cannabis clubs.  
As well as operating in a grey area of domestic law, Spain’s cannabis clubs straddle 
the blurred boundary in international and European instruments between ‘personal 
consumption’ and ‘drug trafficking’. This article explores the theoretical and doctrinal 
implications of both the Spanish law on cannabis clubs and comparative human rights 
law on drug use in order to outline the potential contours of a constitutionally protected 
zone of privacy pertaining to cannabis use in a social context. 
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The concept of ‘personal consumption’ is of normative relevance in the international 
legal framework for drug control and in the national legal systems of many countries.  
Under the international legal framework for drug control,2 the obligation on signatories 
to treat drug ‘trafficking’ as a criminal offence liable to criminal sanction is relaxed in 
relation to drug possession, purchase and cultivation where it is for ‘personal 
consumption’.3 With the endorsement of several United Nations agencies, a growing 
number of countries have adopted or now seek to implement new domestic frameworks 
that include the decriminalisation 4 of drug use and drug possession and cultivation 
where it is for personal consumption.5 There is now a growing body of human rights 
law that includes drug use within the constitutionally protected area of privacy. Debates 
and discussion in drug policy literature on personal consumption are confined to 
procedural and evidential questions regarding the pros and cons of legislatively 
proscribed minimum quantitative thresholds in national systems. 6   It is the potential 
breadth of the concept of ‘personal consumption’ in the substantive law of countries 
where such conduct is excluded from the ambit of the criminal law that I seek to explore 
in this article.7 
The legal framework of Spain’s ‘cannabis clubs’ provides a useful case-study 
for exploring the normative boundary between ‘trafficking’ and ‘personal 
consumption’. In recent decades cannabis consumers there have created cannabis 
associations for the collective cultivation of cannabis and its distribution on the private 
premises of the associative body.  ‘Cannabis club’ is the term used to describe this 
practice in Spain, the criminality of which is a continual source of doctrinal debate and 
judicial pronouncement there.  The continued operation of cannabis clubs in Spain have 
generated interest in international drug policy literature8 and influence on legislative 
reform9 in the absence of much by way of legal scrutiny or theoretical analysis of the 
context in which they evolved. 
                                                             
2 The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) (as amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention); 
The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances; The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic and 
Psychotropic Substances (1988). 
3 The possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances for personal consumption are 
listed in Article 3(2) of the 1988 Convention as forms of conduct in relation to which the obligation to criminalise in 
domestic legislation is subject to the constitutional principles and basic concepts of a state’s legal system. Article 3(4)(d) 
of the 1988 Convention makes provision for parties which have created a criminal offence of drug possession, purchase 
or cultivation for personal consumption to apply measures for the treatment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation or social 
reintegration of the offender as an alternative to conviction or punishment pursuant to it. 
4 Decriminalisation is defined as ‘The removal of sanctions under the criminal law, with optional use of administrative 
sanctions (e.g. provision of civil fines or court-ordered therapeutic responses)’ – C Hughes and A Stevens, 'What can we 
learn from the Portuguese decriminalization of illicit drugs?' (2010) British Journal of Criminology 50 999–1022. 
5 N Eastwood et al., A Quiet Revolution: Drug Criminalisation Across the Globe (Release, 2016). 
6 Ibid. 
7 See for example Chile’s drug law offence which expressly excludes proscribed conduct from the criminal law where for 
the purpose of ‘personal consumption’(Ley 20,0000) available at http://bcn.cl/1uuq1 
8 See G Murkin, Cannabis social clubs in Spain: legalisation without commercialisation (Transform 2015) available 
at http://www.tdpf.org.uk/resources/publications/cannabis-social-clubs-spain-legalisation-without-commercialisation 
(accessed 2 Aug. 2016); X Arana and V Montañés Sánchez, ‘Cannabis Cultivation in Spain – The Case of Cannabis Social 
Clubs’ in T Decorte, GR Potter and M Bouchard, World Wide Weed: Global Trends in Cannabis Cultivation and its Control 
(Ashgate 2011); M Jelsma, T Blickman and D Bewley-Taylor, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition: The History of 
Cannabis in the UN Drug Control System and Options for Reform (TNI 2014), available at http://www.tni.org/rise-and-
decline (accessed 2 Aug. 2016). 
9 The most prominent example is the provision made for cannabis collectives in Uruguayan legislation on cannabis in 
article 5(f) of Ley 19.172. 
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Spain is a Continental legal system and all of its criminal offences are contained 
in its Criminal Code. The doctrine of legal goods (also referred to as the doctrine of 
legal interests) is a basic concept in Spain’s as well as other Continental legal systems 
of the ‘Germanic legal circle’. 10 A legal good is an interest or good which the law 
properly recognises as being necessary for social peace or for individual well-being, 
and as therefore meriting legal protection.11  The notion of legal good (bien jurídico  in 
Spanish, from the German Rechtsgüt) has a heuristic function in Continental legal 
systems;12  it is a useful term in referencing what the legislature had in mind, for 
categorising offences within the criminal code by the interest sought to be protected 
and for distinguishing therein between collective goods (bien jurídico colectivo, from 
the German kollektive rechtsggüter) and individual goods. Its closest counterpart in 
Anglo-American legal systems is the harm principle13  but whereas the primary function 
of the harm principle is to serve as a critical tool for assessing the legitimacy of 
criminalisation in a liberal democracy, the ability of the doctrine of legal interests to 
serve a normative role is disputed.  14 The doctrine is grounded in positive law, not in 
normative principles concerning what the scope of the law should be.  Both the harm 
principle and doctrine of legal goods are criticised for leading to ‘circularity’ in 
doctrinal discussion and in judicial decisions on the scope of the criminal law. The main 
problem with the harm principle is perceived to be the lack of clarity regarding what 
‘harm’ really is.  15  The principal criticism of the doctrine of legal goods is that ‘little 
progress has been made in developing a normative criteria for determining when a 
legitimate interest for legal protection is present’. 16  Both principle and doctrine are 
widely considered by critics in in their respective legal systems, to be appropriate as 
‘mere first step in the criminalisation process.’ 17 There is a lack of consensus as to what 
that next step should be.  
On account of its criminal law doctrine and the structure of its criminal code, 
Spanish jurisprudence essentially reframes the distinction between ‘personal 
consumption’ and ‘trafficking’ as one between public health (the legal good protected 
by Spain’s drug offence) and individual health. The extent to which collective 
cultivation of cannabis by groups of friends endangers public health, so falling within 
the scope of the criminal law, has occupied the courts in Spain for two decades now 
and continues to be a source of uncertainty in the criminal law.  In this article we are 
not concerned with the legitimacy of public health as a legally protectable interest.  We 
are concerned with the fact that public health is a particularly difficult concept to define, 
making the problem posed by the emergence of cannabis clubs to Spanish legal doctrine 
closely aligned with the principal challenge to the harm principle; what is a harm? The 
theoretical incoherence and normative limitations of treating the public/individual 
health distinction as unitary in the sense of capable of definition in contradistinction to 
the other (one is present wherever the other is not) has been explored in philosophical 
                                                             
10 N.Persak, Criminalising Harmful Conduct.  The Harm Principle, its Limits and Continental Counterparts (Springer, 2007 
11 A Duff in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
12 M D Dubber and T Hörne Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law (OUP, 2014) 
13 According to JS Mill, ‘the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.’. JS Mill, On Liberty and other writings, ed S Colloni (Cambridge 
University Press 1989) 13. 
14 Nineteenth century German scholar Birnbaum is acknowledged as the originator of the doctrine and his purpose in 
creating it was to facilitate the criminalisation of collective goods instead of confining the scope of criminal law to the 
protection of individual rights.   N.Persak, (Springer, 2007) For a recent thesis in favour of attaching providing the 
doctrine with a normative role see M A Álamo Bien Jurídico Penal y Derecho Penal Mínimo de los Derechos Humanos 
(Ediciones universidad Valladoid, 2014) 
15 J Gray, ‘Introduction’ in J.S Mill On Liberty and Other Essays (OUP, 1991) 
16 A V Hirsch ‘Foreword’ in N.Persak, (Springer, 2007) vi 
17 N.Persak, (Springer, 2007) 
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literature on the scope and meaning of ‘public health’ which makes clear that deep 
scrutiny is required of both sides of ‘the demarcation’ (public and individual health).18 
Whereas the Spanish jurisprudence is helpful in exploring the scope of drug trafficking 
(endangerment to public health) it fails to directly address the other side of the 
demarcation (personal consumption).   This article will explore the scope of ‘personal 
consumption’ as a normatively relevant concept in its own right.  For this we turn to 
comparative constitutional case-law in which privacy has been identified as the right 
intruded upon by offences which criminalise personal consumption.  
I seek to illustrate that the only way out of the circularity of doctrinal debates  
on whether or not public health is endangered by cannabis clubs to a criminal extent, is 
to treat the identification of an endangerment to a legal good (public health) as the first 
step in determining whether the criminal law should bite. In human rights law a 
violation of certain human rights will be justified where done in accordance with a law 
that seeks to protect a (legitimate) legal interest and the violation is a proportionate 
response to the necessity of protecting said interest.  In other words, a human rights 
framework requires consideration of the extent to which public health in endangered 
by the conduct and the extent to which an individual’s rights are endangered by the 
measure for protecting public health.  The role of the international human rights 
framework in providing ‘a readily available and legally binding set of broad indicators’ 
against which drug policy goals can be assessed has already been identified in drug 
policy literature.19 Elsewhere, Simon Flacks has persuasively argued that a human 
rights framework is the only appropriate framework, in accordance with both law and 
ethics, through which drug regulation should be addressed.20  As we will see from our 
discussion of comparative human rights law on drug offences, the advantage of a human 
rights framework is it goes further than drawing an abstract distinction between the 
public and private and requires any violation of the private realm to constitute no greater 
interference by the public authority than is necessary to achieve the intended objective 
in public health.   
The comparative constitutional case-law is useful in identifying privacy as the right 
intruded upon by criminal offences impinging upon personal consumption.  Its shortfall 
is in not exploring the scope of personal consumption.  We will see from our historical 
examination of the development of cannabis clubs in Spain that proponents of cannabis 
clubs, through their efforts to prevent their conduct from endangering the legal 
conception of public health, have succeeded in establishing a potential zone of personal 
drug consumption which outstrips that expressly protected in the comparative law 
discussed. I will thus conclude with a discussion of  scope of privacy to shape a broad 
conceptualisation of ‘personal consumption’ that builds on the analytical framework 
developed by the Spanish law on cannabis clubs to provide greater normative coherence 
to the distinction between criminal and non-criminal drug related conduct. 
 
II.THE TRANSNATIONAL CONTEXT 
                                                             
18 R Geuss, Public Goods, Private Goods (Princeton University Press 2003) ch. III, especially 36–41 as cited in J Coggon, 
What Makes Health Public? (Cambridge University Press 2012). Kindle Edition 31. 
19 D Barrett, ‘Harm Reduction is not enough for supply side policy: A human rights-based approach offers more’ (2012) 
International Journal of Drug Policy 23 16-23 at 19. See also D Barrett and M Nowak, ‘The United Nations and Drug Policy: 
Towards a human rights-based approach’ in A Constantindes and N Zailos (eds), The Diversity of International Law. Essays 
in Honour of Professor Kalliopi K. Koufa (Brill/Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 449-477. 
20 S Flacks, ‘Drug Control, Human Rights, and the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health: A Reply to Saul 
Takahashi’ (2011) Human Rights Quarterly 33 856-877. 
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 The two terms ‘trafficking’ and ‘personal consumption’ provide the conceptual 
framework for the penal provisions of the international drug control regime. In this 
section we will see that ‘trafficking’ is a poorly defined and ‘elastic’ concept and 
‘personal consumption’ is not defined at all in the international treaties or elaborated 
upon in the official commentaries.21 We will also see that although the international 
drug control regime acknowledges the potential for normative barriers to the scope of 
‘trafficking,’ what exactly these might be is not elaborated upon in the treaties or 
official commentaries, or indeed within European Union debates on the harmonisation 
of these concepts.  Although European attempts at harmonisation were confined to the 
identification of common definitions and did not enter into consideration of normative 
criteria, what does clearly emerge from these attempts is a clear desire amongst member 
states to draw a distinction, at least in enforcement and sentencing practices, between 
the two concepts of ‘trafficking’ and ‘personal consumption’. 
The definition of the term ‘illicit traffic’ caused major difficulties in the negotiation of 
1988 Convention. The principal source of disagreement was identified at the time as 
being between one group of delegations which ‘strongly favoured a broad-based 
definition covering all aspects of the drug problem from production and supply to 
demand’ and another which ‘preferred a technical definition to a generic one and had 
argued that it was premature to make consumption the subject of international action’.22 
The ‘general consensus’ reached was that the notion of illicit trafficking would, instead 
of being defined, consist of a reference to all drug offences that states would be obliged 
to create and for this to include the possession, purchase or cultivation of a drug for 
personal consumption, but for the obligation in relation to these offences to be subject 
to the ‘safeguard wording’ that subjected this obligation to the constitution and basic 
principles of each signatory’s legal system, and further provision was made for 
alternatives to imprisonment as a punishment for such offences when they are created.23 
This compromise position was a political fudge which succeeded in obscuring 
underlying tensions in the global consensus. 
Several calls have been made since for refinement of the concepts of drug 
trafficking and personal consumption within the European Union by both governmental 
and non-governmental bodies.24 The first attempt at harmonisation of the European 
conception of drug trafficking was made by the European Commission in 2001 in its 
proposal for a Council framework decision laying down minimum provisions on the 
constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking. 
                                                             
21 A Marks, ‘Legal Perspectives  on Drug Trafficking’ in V Mitsilegas, S Hufnagel and A Moiseienko (eds), Research 
Handbook on Transnational Crime (Edward Elgar, forthcoming). 
22 United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, Vienna, 25 November-20 December 1988: official records. Volume 2, Summary records of plenary meetings, 
summary records of meeting of Committee I and Committee II' (hereafter UN Conference 1988), Committee 1, 24th 
meeting, 151 para 13. 
23 Article 3(2) of the 1988 Convention 
24 Commission Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment Accompanying the document: Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on new psychoactive substances and proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 October 2004 laying down 
minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit trafficking, as regards 
the definition of drug', Brussels, 17 Sept. 2013, SWD(2013) 319, 85, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52013SC0319 (accessed 28 Feb. 2017) and Minority Opinion by Maurizio Turco, Marco 
Cappato and Ilka Shröder, Report on the proposal for a Council Framework Decision laying down minimum provisions on 
the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of drug trafficking (15102/2/2003 – C5-0618/2003 – 
2001/0114(CNS)) (Renewed consultation) Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs, 
European Parliament, 23 Feb. 2004, 6, 9. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A5-2004-0095+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=pl 
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25 By way of preparation for this initiative the Commission carried out a study of the 
definitions used and penalties applied in the field of drug trafficking in Europe.26 In its 
subsequent proposal, the Commission underlined that it proposed a common definition, 
covering acts which are classified as offences in all Member States, and that essential 
criteria in this definition are the notions of acting ‘for profit’ and ‘without 
authorisation’.27 The proposed by the Commission specifically excluded (i) simple 
users who illegally produce, acquire and/or possess narcotics for personal use and (ii) 
users who sell narcotics without the intention of making a profit (for example, someone 
who passes on narcotics to their friends without making a profit) which it stated to be 
‘in line with the practice in all the Member States’.In Article 1 of the Commission’s 
proposal, ‘illicit drug trafficking’ was defined as ‘the act, without authorisation, of 
selling and marketing as well as, for profit, of cultivating, producing, manufacturing, 
importing or sending or, for the purpose of transferring for profit, of receiving, 
acquiring and possessing drugs’ [author’s emphasis]. 28  Article 2 of the proposal 
required member states to make illicit drug trafficking, as defined in Article 1 of the 
proposal, a criminal offence. According to the Commission, this proposed definition 
embraced ‘the key elements’ trafficking in the 1988 United Nations Convention against 
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.29  
It took the Council of the European Union over two years to resolve 
disagreements and finalise a text which it then took Parliament a further seven months 
of further discussions to agree upon. The Commission had wanted to propose ‘stricter 
definitions than those laid down in the UN Conventions on the fight against drugs, but 
the Council reduced the definition back to those in the conventions’.30 In the ensuing 
Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA, 31  we find a similar compromise or 
political fudge to that reached in the 1988 Convention. 32 
The Council Framework Decision does not include a definition of drug 
trafficking, but instead lists the conduct member states are obliged to make punishable 
in Article 2 and under the heading of ‘crimes linked to trafficking in drugs and 
precursors’. Article 2 (1) of Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA provides that 
‘Each Member State Shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following 
intentional conduct when committed without right is punishable: a) … the offering, 
offering for sale, distribution, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, 
dispatch in transit, transport, importation or exportation of drugs; … c) the possession 
                                                             
25 'Proposal for a Council Framework Decision laying down Minimum Provisions on the Constituent Elements of Criminal 
Acts and Penalties in the Field of Illicit Drug Trafficking, submitted by the Commission on 27 June 2001 (2001/C 304 
E/03)' (hereafter 2001 Council Proposal), Official Journal of the European Communities 304 E/172, 30 Oct. 2001. 
26 Study on the Legislation and Regulations on Drug Trafficking in the European Member States, European Commission 
Directorate-General Justice And Home Affairs, February 2001. 
27 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision, ibid, Explanatory Memorandum, Commentary on Individual Articles 
28 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision, ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Report on the proposal for a Council Framework Decision laying down minimum provisions on the constituent 
elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of drug trafficking (15102/2/2003 – C5-0618/2003 – 
2001/0114(CNS)) (Renewed consultation) Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs, 
European Parliament, 23 Feb. 2004, 6. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A5-2004-0095+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=pl 
31 COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION 2004/757/JHA of 25 October 2004 laying down minimum provisions on the 
constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking, Official Journal of the European 
Union, L 335/8, 11.11.2004. 
32 That the final text constituted a political compromise is clear from the Explanatory Statement in the Report of the 
Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs, European Parliament in February 2004, which 
concluded that on account of the length of time it took Parliament to reach unanimous agreement it was ‘politically wiser 
to accept the framework decision as agreed’ than for further amendments to be tabled, bearing in mind that it is a ‘first 
small but very decisive step towards the creation of a common judicial space’ and that ‘it is clear that this framework 
decision does not ask Member States to change their drug policy.’ 
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or purchase of drugs with a view to conducting one of the activities listed in (a); d) the 
… transport or distribution of precursors, knowing that they are to be used in or for the 
illicit production or manufacture of drugs’. Article 2 (2) specifically excludes from the 
scope of the Framework Decision conduct described in paragraph (1) ‘when it is 
committed by its perpetrators exclusively for their own personal consumption as 
defined by national law’.33 [author’s emphasis] 
The Council Framework does not include a definition of ‘personal 
consumption’ but leaves this to the national legal systems to define.  We will now turn 
our attention to the principal focus of this article, which is the struggle undergone by 
the Spanish legal system, in seeking to maintain a clear distinction between ‘trafficking’ 
and ‘personal consumption’. As we will see, the cannabis club model created in Spain 
would not satisfy the Commission’s proposed definition of drug trafficking on account 
of the absence of profit, but in the absence of a clear definition of trafficking, it 
continues to straddle the murky boundary between the two concepts.  
 
III. SPANISH DRUG LEGISLATION 
Prior to 1967, drug trafficking in narcotic substances and the unauthorised sale of 
pharmaceutical substances deemed capable of harming health were dealt with in the 
same article of the criminal code, which criminalised unauthorised production of these 
materials for the purpose of their commercialisation as an offence against public health, 
punishable with a fine.34 The provisions stipulated that where the substances were toxic 
or narcotic (including cannabis) then the fine should be at the higher end of the scale, 
but in all other respects the law treated the drug trafficker and the unlicensed purveyor 
of pharmaceutical goods as one and the same. 35  Although the offence only made 
specific reference to the production (elaboración) of drugs, the Supreme Court 
interpreted the offence broadly so as to embrace all commercially oriented conduct 
involving drugs, including their trafficking and their possession where the intention of 
the defendant was to commercialise the product (in the sense of supplying it to others 
and not in the absence of such intention). 36  Civil preventative measures (such as 
internment for rehabilitative and educational purposes and outpatient treatment) were 
available and frequently applied to persons intoxicated with alcohol and other drugs.37 
In 1966, during the dictatorship of Francisco Franco (1939-1975), Spain ratified 
the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 (the Single Convention). The 
Narcotics Act 17/1967 (the 1967 Act) provides that all substances listed in schedule IV 
of the Single Convention (including cannabis) may not be produced, cultivated, 
trafficked, possessed or used except in the quantities necessary for medical and 
                                                             
33 Ibid.  
34 Articles 34-343 of the Criminal Code 1944: first introduced in the criminal code of 1928. 
35 JC Usó, Drogas y Cultura de Masas: España 1855-1995 (Taurus 1996) 161. 
36 STS 1534/1966 de 13 de diciembre de 1966  and STS 995/1972 se 17 de enero de 1972 
37 Ley de 4 de agosto de 1933 de Vagos y Maleantes and Ley de Peligrosidad y Rehabilitación Social de 1970. The first overhaul 
of the criminal code was made in 1995, and this repealed the Law on Social Danger 1970 (Ley de Peligrosidad y 
Rehabilitación Social  de 1970, Ley 16/1970 de 4 de agosto), several provisions of which had already been declared 
unconstitutional  by Spain’s Constitutional Court.  See Usó, Drogas y Cultura de Masas, 258-265; Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 
23 noviembre del Código Penal; JL de la Cuesta and I Blanco, ‘Spain: non-criminalisation of possession, graduated penalties 
on Supply’ in N Dorn and A Jamieson (eds), European Drug Laws: the Room for Manoeuvre: Overview of comparative legal 
research into national drug laws of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden and their relation to three 
international drugs conventions (DrugScope 2000), available at http://www.drugtext.org/European-Drug-Laws/cover-a-
contents.html (accessed 1 Aug. 2016). 
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scientific research and with authorization from the relevant state department. 38 The 
1967 Act did not create any criminal offences or penalties in breach of its provisions, 
but any such conduct is deemed to be illicit (albeit not necessarily criminal or otherwise 
punishable) on account of the Act. The primary purpose of the 1967 Act was to 
incorporate the provisions of the Single Convention 1961 into Spanish law and thereby 
specify which substances the subsequent criminal and administrative offences on drugs 
in its domestic law relate to. Reforms introduced to Spain’s Criminal code in 1971 (Ley 
44/1971) were the first to expressly criminalise conduct related to narcotics as a distinct 
offence from the unauthorised trade in pharmaceuticals.39 Article 344 of the Criminal 
Code created a generic criminal offence against public health for all activities, expressly 
including cultivation, fabrication, production, transportation, possession, sale, donation 
and trafficking, that promote, encourage or facilitate illicit narcotic use. 40  The 
explanatory memorandum to Ley 44/1971 stated that whereas drug trafficking had 
hitherto only been criminalised indirectly (by the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation 
of the offence of unauthorised production), it was now expressly prohibited in the 
legislation.41 On account of the specific articulation of drug ‘possession’ in the criminal 
offence, several prosecutions were brought against persons found in simple possession 
of narcotics. The Supreme Court explained that possession for personal use remained 
outside the scope of the offence.42  The Court justified its decision  in accordance with 
(i) the grammatical dictates of  the revised Article 344, which criminalised the specified 
activities ‘and any other means of promoting, encouraging or facilitating drug use’; (ii) 
the legal good the offence sought to protect (its bien jurídico)43 which it noted as being 
specified in the Criminal Code as the collective good of public health (iii) a societal 
acceptance of drug consumers as  infirm persons in possession of a drug for the sole 
purpose of satisfying their own vice who ought not therefore be punished by the 
criminal law, but instead rehabilitated in accordance with the provision of the Law on 
Social Danger 197044 and (iv) the distinction drawn in the previous jurisprudence of 
Spain’s supreme court, and by several parties to the Single Convention, including 
Switzerland, between possession for supply and possession for personal use. The 
Supreme Court’s decision, whilst not welcomed by the national prosecutor, was 
conceded to be a correct interpretation of Article 344.45  
In 1983, after Spain’s transition from dictatorship to democracy and the 
ratification of the Spanish Constitution in 1978, urgent reforms were introduced to the 
criminal code with the stated purpose of updating it in accordance with the values 
enshrined in the new constitution. 46 Included in the reforms was a subtle rewording of 
the criminal offence on drugs to more clearly reflect the exclusion of possession for 
                                                             
38 Articles 8 and 22 of Ley 17/1967, de 8 de abril, De Estupefacientes (BOE núm. 86, de 11 abril [RCL 1967, 706]). 
39 Molina Pérez, 'Breves notas sobre la evolución histórica de los estupefacientes en la legislación española', 313. 
40 Ley 44/1971 de 15 de noviembre, available at  https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1971/11/16/pdfs/A18415-18419.pdf 
(accessed 2 Aug. 2016). 
41 Ibid 
42 STS 2225/1974; 8th May 1974 and STS 541/1973 de 16 de octubre de 1973 and in accordance with the earlier 
decisions of the Supreme Court STS 764/1973, 10th October 1973 and STS 245/1974 of the 14th February 1974. 
43 It is clear from reading the principal doctrinal text on the doctrine of legal goods at the time that the doctrine was 
considered to serve a heuristic as a opposed to a normative role; M P Navarrete, El bien jurídico en el derecho penal 
(Universidad de Sevilla, 1974) 
44 Ley de Peligrosidad y Rehabilitación Social de 1970.  
45 The national prosecutor subsequently conceded that possession for personal possession remained outside of the 
criminal law and opined that this would make little difference in practice on account of the tendency amongst consumers 
to sell drugs to fund their habit: Usó, Drogas y Cultura de Masas, 268 
46 For an English text of the Spanish Constitution see GE Gloss, ‘The New Spanish Constitution, Comments and Full Text’ 
(1979) Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 7:47. 
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personal use from the criminal law.47 The same revision introduced a distinction for 
sentencing purposes between ‘hard’ drugs (those which cause serious damage to health) 
and ‘soft’ drugs (that cause less harm to health and include cannabis) and reduced the 
maximum sentences for drug offences as well as providing a staggered approach to 
sentencing – contributing to a general perception that the Spanish government was 
being soft in its approach to drug offences.48 A political backlash ensued against the 
PSOE49 government’s soft approach to drug offences, including campaigns by public 
authorities and political parties for the prohibition of cannabis consumption in public 
places– eloquently illustrated in this quote from the socialist mayor of Valencia: 
 
‘Whoever wants to smoke a joint, do it at home’50 
The first associations of cannabis consumers, the Association of Consumers of 
Cannabis Derivatives in Madrid in 1987 and the Association Ramón Santos of Cannabis 
Studies (ARSEC) in Barcelona in 1991 were established in response to such campaigns. 
In 1992, partly in response to the political backlash,51 the government introduced the 
‘Corcuera Law’, containing administrative penalties for drug consumption and 
possession in public places and for the tolerance of such conduct by owners of 
establishments open to the public.52  
Throughout the parliamentary debates of the ‘Corcuera law’ the Partido 
Popular, then in opposition, repeatedly tabled amendments to criminalise possession 
for personal use, arguing that Spain’s ratification of the 1988 Convention obliged it to 
do so and that the system of administrative fines for public consumption was 
insufficient to satisfy Spain’s treaty obligations.53 Article 3 (2) of the 1988 Convention 
obliges parties to establish as a criminal offence the possession and cultivation of drugs 
for personal consumption unless doing so would be inconsistent with the parties’ 
constitutional principles and the basic concepts of their legal systems. The PSOE 
government maintained that this exception applied to the Spanish legal system and both 
houses of parliament repeatedly rejected the amendments of the Partido Popular. The 
Spanish government did not specify in the parliamentary debates54  the constitutional 
principles or basic concept with which the criminalisation of possession or cultivation 
for personal consumption would conflict, but frequent reference is made to the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court’s application of the doctrine of legal goods, to the 
right to freedom and to the principle of minimum criminalisation.55 A new Criminal 
                                                             
47  Ley Orgánica 9/1983, de 25 de junio, de Reforma Urgente y Parcial del Código Penal, full text available at 
https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1983/06/27/pdfs/A17909-17919.pdf;  see also J Gamella and MLJ Rodrigo, 'A brief 
history of cannabis policies in Spain (1968–2003)' (2004) Journal of Drug Issues 34 630. 
48 Gamella and Rodrigo, 'A brief history of cannabis policies in Spain' 630. 
49 Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party. 
50 Las Provincias, 19 Oct. 1990, 27, cited in Usó, Drogas y Cultura de Masas, 302. 
51 Usó, Drogas y Cultura de Masas, 301-302. 
52 Ley Orgánica 1/1992 sobre la Protección de Seguridad Ciudadana.  See S Greer, ‘Police Powers in Spain: “The Corcuera 
Law”' (1994) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 43.2 405-416 for a fascinating account in English of the more 
general provisions of this law. 
53 The People’s Party is a conservative and Christian democratic party and is one of the four main political parties. 
54 Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales, Congreso de los Diputados, núm 219, 8 octubre 1992, 10772-10784. 
55 The principle of minimum criminalisation acknowledges that the criminal law is the most restrictive and severe of legal 
instruments and holds that as such it should only be resorted to where the objective sought is incapable of being achieved 
by less restrictive means. See Juan Córdoba Roda, ‘El principio de intervención mínima en el fenómeno de la expansión de 
la justicia penal’ in  El Derecho En La Factultad: Cuarenta años de la nueva Facultad de Derecho de Barcelona (Marcial Pons 
2001). 
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Code was introduced in 1995, and did not include a criminal offence for possession for 
personal consumption. 
The principal administrative and criminal infractions relating to drugs are now 
contained, respectively, in Organic Law 4/2015 for the Protection of the Security of the 
Citizen56 and in Article 368 of the Criminal Code. The consumption and possession of 
drugs in a public place, and the cultivation of drugs in a place that is visible to the public 
are punishable under the administrative legal framework with financial penalties. 
Wherever such conduct amounts to a criminal offence, it ceases to be punishable in the 
administrative law. Article 368 of the Criminal Code makes it a criminal offence: 
to cultivate, produce, traffic, or otherwise promote, encourage or facilitate the 
illegal consumption of toxic drugs, narcotics or psychotropic substances, or to 
possess these substances with such objectives.57 (author’s emphasis) 
The source, meaning and implications of the phrase ‘illegal consumption’ in 
Article 368 have greatly exercised the minds of the Spanish legal profession; how can 
any activities specified in Article 368 be criminal when all that is facilitated by them is 
drug consumption, an activity which is not (at least when conducted in private) 
punishable in law and therefore not illegal? 58  According to the Supreme Court, 
although neither the UN treaties nor the 1967 law make provision for any sanctions for 
the conduct therein proscribed, they do state that the possession or use of the drugs 
listed in the schedules to the Convention is unlawful unless authorised by the state on 
medical or scientific grounds. As pithily summarised by the Supreme Court ‘Article 
368 does not punish consumption, but it does punish all activity that encourages it.’ 59  
 
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF SHARED CONSUMPTION DEVELOPED BY 
SPAIN’S SUPREME COURT 
During the 1990s the ‘innovative spirit’ of Spain’s Supreme Court developed 
what is now commonly referred to as the doctrine of shared consumption, the practical 
effect of which was to include possession for shared consumption amongst a closed 
circle of drug consumers within the concept of non-criminal personal consumption by 
excluding it from ‘trafficking’.60 The doctrine applies to drug sharing wherever it is 
possible to completely discard the possibility of any risk of drug diffusion amongst 
members of the public. The Supreme Court justifies the creation of the doctrine with 
reference to the disproportionate (desmesurada) breadth otherwise constituted by the 
drug offence outlined in Article 368 of the Spanish Criminal Code, the specific 
objective of which is the protection of public health.61 This reference to proportionality 
might suggest a normative turn in the Court’s application of the doctrine, were it not 
for the fact that no mention is made in the Court’s judgment of any right or interest that 
such criminalization might infringe. The Court’s reasoning is simply that the protected 
good of the generic criminal offence is public health; just as where drugs are possessed 
for personal consumption, so too where drugs are shared amongst a close group of 
                                                             
56 Ley Orgánica 4/2015, de 30 de marzo, de Protección de la Seguridad Ciudadana.  It is a new version of Ley Orgánica 
1/1992 Protección de la Seguridad Ciudadana. 
57 Author’s translation of Article 368 of the Criminal Code of Spain. 
58 See for example JLD Ripollés and J Muñoz Sánchez, ‘Licitud de autoorganización del consumo de drogas’ (2012) Jueces 
para la democracia 79 56-60, and STS: 670/1994, 17th March 1994. 
59 STS 484/2015, 23. 
60 STS 484/2015, 32 and STS 1014/2013, de 12 diciembre and cited at STS 596/2015, 17. 
61 STS 397/2016. 
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friends and drug consumers, the drugs are not distributed to ‘others’ in the sense of third 
parties, and so public health is not affected, or at least not to any significant extent, and 
no criminal offence is thereby committed.  
Cultivation of cannabis is specifically listed in Article 368 as an activity that 
might promote the unlawful use of drugs. The Supreme Court (with one notable 
exception discussed below) has consistently ruled that cultivation will only amount to 
a criminal offence where it facilitates illicit drug consumption by third parties; just as 
all actions including drug acquisition, demand and production, are not punished in 
criminal law where their objective is personal consumption (including shared 
consumption), so too is this the case with cultivation. There will be no criminal offence 
in the absence of ‘otherness’; where the cultivation does not promote, encourage or 
facilitate consumption by others it will not be punishable in criminal law.62 
Whilst a criminal offence will not have been committed in the absence of the 
‘otherness’ (alteridad) that connotes a threat to public health, the precise meaning of 
‘otherness’ has proven elusive. The shared consumption doctrine is the means by which 
the Supreme Court has sought to identify the absence of ‘otherness’. The doctrine has 
continued to evolve since its inception in the 1990s, as the circumstances in which 
parties have sought to apply it diversified and the resulting case law has been described 
as contradictory.63 The Supreme Court has noted that public health is a particularly 
abstract concept; it exists neither as a measurable reality nor as the sum of the health of 
individual persons.64 Jacob Dopico Gómez-Aller, author of the most comprehensive 
critical analysis of the Court’s application of the shared consumption doctrine, 
attributes inconsistencies and contradictions within it to the fact that public health is 
‘an ideal, with incredibly vague outlines, at least in the jurisprudence on drug 
trafficking; not so much in other offences that endanger public health such as those for 
pharmaceuticals and food’. 65  I argue that the Supreme Court’s reframing of the 
distinction between ‘personal consumption’ and ‘drug trafficking’ as one between 
public health and individual health limits its normative reach by reifying the abstract 
concept of ‘public health’.  The extent to which the analytical framework created by 
Spain’s Supreme court is ‘theoretically flawed’ and ‘normatively useless’ will be 
illustrated by my analysis of recent Supreme Court decisions on the inapplicability of 
the shared consumption doctrine to cannabis clubs and is best explained by public 
health theorist John Coggon: 
 
Setting the public up as an entity that is in and of itself ontologically separable 
from the individual people it comprises is formally problematic. It pulls 
something from nowhere – essentially off the back of a metaphor – and then 
obscures any sound purpose of the metaphor. Conceptual notions such as the 
public good, public purpose, or public interest do not require the 
conceptualisation and reification of an abstract concept. In fact, the creation of 
such an entity is problematic and can lead to considerable (and illusory) analytic 
problems: the public’s interests enter into conceptual normative disputes, for 
example ‘between the individual and society’. Such a formulation pits people 
outside of and against something of which they are supposed to be a part. This 
                                                             
62 STS 484/2015, 26. 
63 For a comprehensive analysis of the case-law see JD Gómez-Aller, Transmisiones atípicas de drogas: Crítica a la 
jurisprudencia de la excepcionalidad (Tirant lo Blanch 2012). 
64 STS 484/2015, 23. 
65 Gómez-Aller, Transmisiones atípicas de drogas, 17. 
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is a point of crucial importance to the sound analysis of public health. We should 
reject as analytically crippling and conceptually invalid the idea that we can 
draw an antagonistic dichotomy between ‘the individual and society’66 
 
We will see the challenge posed by cannabis clubs to the coherence of the shared 
consumption doctrine below, but first we must understand how civil society sought to 
protect the rights and freedoms of cannabis consumers through the exercise of the right 
to freedom of association. It is in their efforts to protect their activities from 
endangering public health that we will find our framework for testing the boundaries of 
the right to privacy in the context of drug laws in the final section of this article. 
 
V THE EMERGENCE OF CANNABIS ASSOCIATIONS AND THEIR 
EVOLUTION INTO CANNABIS CLUBS  
The birth of Spain’s cannabis activism and its evolution into the widespread 
establishment of cannabis consumer associations and clubs is best described as civil 
society’s response to their perceived need to protect the rights and freedoms of cannabis 
consumers and their right to recreational drug use in a social context.67  Cannabis 
consumers perceived the administrative penalties introduced by the ‘Corcuera law’ as 
an unacceptable infringement on personal freedom. Whilst administrative penalties do 
not carry the social stigma or risk of imprisonment of a criminal offence, they make it 
difficult for cannabis consumers to consume cannabis in a social context, as they would 
be unable to transport the substance in public without risking administrative fines.  
Section 22 of the Spanish Constitution protects the right to freedom of 
association as a fundamental right. The Law 1/2002 on Regulation of the Right to 
Association provides regulations for not-for-profit associations, one of several means 
of exercising the right to freedom of association in Spanish law.68 The preamble to Law 
1/2002 acknowledges the importance attached to the freedom of association in the legal 
traditions of Spain and the European Union and of the vital role played by associations 
in conserving democracy by enabling individuals to share their convictions, actively 
pursue their ideals, ensure that their voices and opinions are heard and to exert influence 
and provoke social changes by representing the interests of citizens to public 
authorities. Associations constitute legal entities consisting of three or more persons 
with shared interests. Associations must have constitutions that lay out the basis on 
which they operate and their communal objectives. This constitution must be 
democratic and provide for the holding of a general assembly at least once a year. Any 
and all monies generated by the association must be used to further the objectives of 
the association. An association must be inscribed in a public register and the registration 
must include a copy of its constitution. Associations that pursue criminal activities are 
illegal and secret associations and those of a paramilitary character are prohibited. 
Associations may only be dissolved or have their activities suspended by virtue of a 
court order stating the reasons for dissolution.69 
                                                             
66 Coggon, What Makes Health Public? 29 
67 Usó, Drogas y Cultura de Masas, 304-5; see also OP Franquero and JCB Saiz, Innovation Born of Necessity: Pioneering 
Drug Policy in Catalonia (Open Society Foundations 2015), 14, 34, available at 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/20150428-innovation-born-necessity-pioneering-drug-
policy-catalonia.pdf (accessed 28 Feb. 2016).   
68 Ley Orgánica 1/2002, de 22 de marzo, reguladora del Derecho de Asociación. 
69 Further and more detailed regional regulations supplement the national legislation. 
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At the general assembly of Association Ramón Santos of Cannabis Studies 
(ARSEC) in 1993, some 150 members debated and agreed to plant a cultivation of 
cannabis for their collective consumption. Their crop was impounded by the police and 
the four governing members of the association charged with drug trafficking in 
contravention of Article 368. The case was tried by the provincial court of Tarragona 
and the defendants acquitted of all charges, the court concluding that no criminal law 
had been breached on account of the cultivation being intended for their own personal 
consumption.  The prosecution appealed the decision to the Supreme Court under 
article 849 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal) that 
provides a ground of appeal for allegedly incorrect applications of the law to the proven 
facts. The Supreme Court (1997) overturned the first instance decision and convicted 
the defendants, on the basis that any unauthorised cultivation of cannabis necessarily 
endangered public health.70 The decision in the ARSEC case was considered to be 
aberrant by legal commentators on account of the number of earlier decisions by the 
Supreme Court to the effect that cultivation was not a criminal offence where the 
purpose of the cultivation is personal consumption. 71 The decision did not amount to 
binding precedent and was largely ignored by the lower courts. The ARSEC case was 
the last of its kind to be heard in the Supreme Court until 2015 as changes to judicial 
procedure restricted the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to offences for 
which the maximum sentence is five years or more. Criminal prosecutions for cannabis 
cultivation were thenceforth decided by the single judges and the regional courts of the 
fifty provinces of Spain, which exercise criminal jurisdiction for offences where the 
maximum penalty does not exceed five years. In the exercise of their criminal 
jurisdiction the provincial courts act as both trial courts and appeal courts.72 During the 
interim period of almost twenty years between the first appeal to the Supreme Court 
concerning an association of cannabis consumers in 1997 and the second in 2015, a 
synthesis of developments in the social, judicial and local political spheres resulted in 
a dramatic proliferation of cannabis social clubs throughout Spain and their firm 
entrenchment in the social fabric of at least Catalonia and the Basque country. 73                                                                                      
The number of associations in operation throughout Spain rose to somewhere 
in the region of 1,000 by 2015, some of them with several thousand members and many 
subscribing to detailed self-regulation promulgated by federations of cannabis 
associations.74 Included amongst the objectives listed in the constitutions of several of 
the associations is the provision of a private space for the exercise of member rights to 
autonomy over their mind and body, dignity and the right to free development of the 
personality. 75  The associations rented premises for members to congregate and 
socialise (private members' clubs) and obtained licenses for these to ensure compliance 
with fire safety, smoke evacuation and other public health requirements of various 
regulations by the municipal authorities for their activities, which include the 
dispensation and consumption of cannabis cultivated on behalf of the membership 
body. The clubs operate very much like bars or cafes in terms of their provision of 
social spaces, cultural entertainment, refreshment, Wi-Fi and work-spaces but their 
                                                             
70 TS 17 November 1997, 3014/1996. For commentary see A Herrero, 'El cannabis y sus derivados en el derecho penal 
español' (2000) Addicciones 12 322. 
71 Herrero, 'El cannabis y sus derivados en el derecho penal español' 322, citing STS 12/12/1990 and STS 17/1/1994. 
72 For a detailed account of Spanish legal procedure see E Merino-Blanco, Spanish Law and Legal System (Sweet and 
Maxwell 2006) and L Bachmaier and A Del Moral García, Criminal Law in Spain (Kluwer International 2011). 
73 See Franquero and Saiz, Innovation Born of Necessity. 
74  Ibid. There are no reliable records of the number of associations in existence and this is based on estimates given to 
parliament, see http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L10/CORT/DS/CM/DSCG-10- CM-126.pdf. 
75 O Casals and A Marks, ‘La rosa verda: El florecer de los derechos fundamentales en el debate sobre las drogas en 
España’ in DP Martínez Oró (ed.), Las sendas de la regulación del cannabis en España (Ediciones Bellaterra 2017). 
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legal identity is distinguished by their private membership, democratic method of 
management, not-for profit status and by the provision of cannabis for consumption on 
the premises. 76 
 
VI.THE CANNABIS CLUBS: DRUG TRAFFICKING OR PERSONAL 
(SHARED) CONSUMPTION? 
Regional prosecutions of the governing members of the cannabis associations attracted 
criticism from several quarters including the Ombudsman of the Basque country.77 The 
consensus of opinion in legal journals was that the cannabis clubs were not in breach 
of the criminal law. 78 The vast majority of criminal investigations into cannabis 
associations throughout the country between 1999 and 2015 resulted in stays of 
proceedings or acquittals by both judges at first instance and provincial courts.79 In 
terms of jurisprudential doctrine, the majority of judgments went no further than noting 
that the conduct complained of came within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s doctrine 
on shared consumption. One notable exception is a judgment by the Audiencia 
Provincial of Palma de Mallorca (henceforth the Audiencia) in 2014, in an appeal by 
the prosecution of the decision by a first instance judge in Ibiza acquitting the 
defendants of drug trafficking for their operation of a cannabis club. 80 In their grounds 
of appeal the prosecution argued that the doctrine of shared consumption was of no 
application to cannabis associations. The case is notable because in it the Audiencia 
recognised the that the doctrine of shared consumption was in practice no more than a 
tool for ensuring that only conduct which endangers public health is criminalised. 
The Audiencia noted that the Supreme Court’s shared consumption doctrine had 
undergone a process of amplification over the years but that its core requirements could 
be listed as the following: (i) the collective consumption must take place out of public 
sight for the purpose of avoiding drug diffusion amongst third parties; (ii) the amount 
of the drug must be consistent with personal and occasional consumption; (iii) the 
collective must be a small nucleus of individually identifiable drug users; (iv) the drug 
must be for immediate consumption. A final requirement, that the users must be addicts, 
had been extended by the Supreme Court to include persons who habitually consume 
drugs at weekends, or special occasions such as parties and celebrations. The first four 
requirements are concerned with ensuring that there is no risk of the drug going beyond 
the intended recipients or encouraging others to consume drugs; the final requirement 
in ensuring that the intended recipient is not a member of the public who has been 
encouraged to consume drugs by the supplier, but a person who is already a regular 
consumer at the time of being supplied. 
  According to the Audiencia the issue for its consideration was whether the 
conduct of the defendants came within the shared consumption doctrine, or within a 
                                                             
76 Franquero and Saiz, Innovation Born of Necessity. 
77 Resolución 2015R-486-14 del Arateko [Ombudsman] de 9 de febrero de 2015. 
78 See for example J Muñoz Sánchez and SS Navarro, 'Uso terapéutico del cannabis y creación de establecimientos para su 
adquisición y consumo: viabilidad legal' (2000) Boletín Criminológico 47 1-4; Ripollés and Muñoz, ‘Licitud de la 
autoorganización del consumo de drogas’. Concern was however expressed in several quarters that not all of the clubs 
subscribe to the democratic structures or non-profit nature stipulated by Law 1/2002 on Regulation of the Right to 
Association, or to the good practice guidelines of the federations which prohibit advertising or active recruitment of new 
members (necessary to comply with the prohibition on encouraging drug use in Article 368). See generally Franquero 
and Saiz, Innovation Born of Necessity. 
79 For the most comprehensive compilation of such cases see Fundación Renovatio, Autos y Sentencias Relacionada con la 
autorganización del Consumo (2013) available on request from fundacionrenovatio@gmail.com and Muñoz Sánchez, ‘La 
Relevancia Penal de Los Clubes Sociales de Cannabis’. 
80 Audiencia Provincial, Palma De Mallorca, Section 1, Appeal No: 162/14, SAP IB 2541/2014. 
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variation of that doctrine that shared the same raison d'être. The Audiencia found two 
notable diversions by the cannabis association from the criteria established for the 
application of the shared consumption doctrine: (i) the shared consumption doctrine 
stipulates that the drug possessed is for immediate use and this cannot be said about an 
un-harvested cannabis crop; (ii) the number of members in a cannabis association 
exceeds those considered in cases heard by the Supreme Court (usually groups of three 
or four). In relation to the first point of diversion, the Audiencia stated that it must be 
borne in mind that cultivation is a lengthy process of several months and it is therefore 
logical for the amounts possessed to exceed what might be consumed immediately. The 
Audiencia observed that it was far from surprising that cannabis consumers, wishing to 
avoid engagement with the black market and all the risks it entails, resort to domestic 
cultivation, particularly given the ease with which the substance can be readily 
cultivated. Regarding the second, the Audiencia emphasised that the issue in the case 
was whether the defendants had committed the offence of trafficking, which would 
entail the promotion, encouragement or facilitation of drug use by third parties. It 
asserted this to be a qualitative and not a quantitative question on the basis that it would 
be unreasonable for criminality to hinge on the number of consumers. The Audiencia 
held that there is no qualitative distinction between the operation of the association and 
the shared consumption doctrine established by the Supreme Court; collective 
cultivation does not threaten the objective of the criminal law on drug trafficking 
because it is for the consumption of persons who have voluntarily participated in the 
cultivation of their own accord.81 
 
The Audiencia upheld the decision of the court of first instance in acquitting the 
defendants and provided the following findings as its basis for ruling that the 
prosecution had failed to prove the criminality of the conduct: (i) the reasons for the 
creation of the association were reasonable; they had created a stable organisation with 
an organised structure and corresponding articles of association to avoid accessing 
cannabis from the black market. Obtaining cannabis from the black market entails risks 
such as endangering their health with contaminated or adulterated substances; (ii) the 
amount and the identity of persons to whom the cannabis was supplied were 
documented in the association’s paperwork and the amount was limited to two grams 
per member per day, an amount that had been agreed by the board members of the 
association; (iii) there is no qualitative distinction between the operation of the 
association and shared consumption doctrine of the Supreme Court; (iv) the association 
was non-profit and all the money it generated was re-invested in the association; (v) the 
activity of the association conformed with its articles of association; (vi) the shared 
consumption doctrine does not require those supplied to be drug addicts but regular 
drug users; the fact that those supplied voluntarily declared themselves to be consumers 
of cannabis sufficed for its application; (vii) the fact that the association could not 
guarantee that its members did not take their cannabis out of the club for subsequent 
consumption did not make its supply criminal because the amount supplied was limited 
to two grams per person, an amount that posed no threat to public health on account of 
it not being reasonable to claim that such an amount could be destined for drug 
trafficking; (viii) the four kilos of cannabis found on the association’s premises was not 
a significant amount given that the association had 455 members to supply; (ix) there 
was no evidence of supply by the association to persons other than members. The Court 
                                                             
81 Audiencia Provincial, Palma De Mallorca, Section 1, Appeal No: 162/14, SAP IB 2541/2014. 
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concluded that in these circumstances neither the supply nor the cultivation of the 
cannabis by association members amounted to a criminal offence. 
In October 2014 the Anti-Drugs Prosecutor announced an offensive against 
cannabis associations. In his evidence to the Cortes Generales (the bicameral 
parliament) he argued that the shared consumption doctrine is of no application to 
cannabis associations, primarily on account of the large number of people generally 
inscribed in such associations, that the cannabis clubs were therefore criminal and the 
lower courts were incorrect in their application of the law.82  In 2013 the national 
prosecution service started adding the additional charge of membership of a criminal 
organization to prosecutions of persons operating cannabis associations (increasing the 
maximum sentence from four to 10 years) thereby making the decisions of provincial 
courts appealable to the Supreme Court on grounds of an incorrect application of the 
criminal law to the proven facts. The Supreme Court is the most superior court in Spain 
in all matters other than constitutional questions.   
In 2015 the Supreme Court made three rulings on prosecution appeals from 
acquittals by provincial courts in what will henceforth be referred to as the 2015 trio: 
the ‘Ebers case’ 83 , the ‘Three Monkeys case’ 84  and the ‘Pannagh case’. 85  These 
decisions by the Supreme Court in 2015 are its first authoritative pronouncements on 
the application of the criminal law to the organised system of collective of cannabis 
cultivation, distribution and consumption that first emerged in the form of cannabis 
associations in the late 1990s, evolved into cannabis clubs in the 2000s, proliferated 
throughout the country this decade, and which has been sanctioned in multiple 
decisions by regional courts and even regulated by several municipalities. All of the 
Supreme Court cases consist of appeals by the public prosecutor against regional court 
judgments in which operators of cannabis associations were acquitted on the basis of 
an interpretation of the criminal law with which the national prosecutor disagreed. In 
all three cases the Supreme Court decided that the defendants should have been 
convicted but its elaboration upon the applicability of the shared consumption doctrine 
to cannabis clubs, and upon the distinction between trafficking and shared consumption 
remain blurred.  The judgments have not served to clarify the legal status of cannabis 
clubs or stem the controversy and uncertainty surrounding it.86 
In the 2015 trio, the Supreme Court held that the provincial courts, albeit with 
good intentions, had stretched the doctrine of shared consumption to breaking point.87. 
In the trio of judgments the Court states that whilst it is theoretically possible for 
collective cultivations to operate beyond the reach of criminal law and within the 
doctrine of shared consumption, any permanent structure established for the 
dispensation of successive cultivations to an open-ended number of members would be 
likely to be in breach of Article 368, and that the outcome of each case would depend 
                                                             
82 See Diario de sesiones de las cortes generales comisiones mixtas año 2014 X legislatura núm. 127  para el estudio del 
problema de las drogas presidencia del excmo. Sr. D. Gaspar Llamazares Trigo Sesión núm. 20 celebrada el martes 11 de 
noviembre de 2014 en el Palacio del Congreso de los Diputados (available at 
http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L10/CORT/DS/CM/DSCG-10-CM-127.pdf, accessed 22 March 2016). 
83 STS 484/2015. 
84 STS 755/2015. 
85 STS 834/2015. 
86 The legal status of the clubs is often described in the Spanish press as one of ‘alegalidad’. The word made its first 
appearance in the Real Academia Española in 2014 (23rd edition) as a descriptive term for something that is ‘neither 
regulated nor prohibited’. 
87 STS 484/2015, 27. 
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upon its particular facts.  Determining whether the philosophy that inspired the 
exclusion of ‘shared consumption’ from criminal liability applies to collective cannabis 
cultivation would need to be done on a case-by-case basis and not by the judicial 
establishment of a series of semi-administrative requisites. The court expressed concern 
that any such list could substitute the determination of the lawfulness of the activity in 
terms of the extent to which it threatened the interest protected (public health) with a 
subscription to protocols of a quasi-administrative nature. Whilst the courts can provide 
indications and guidance in a given case, it is for the legislature alone to establish a list 
of requirements, the presence of which would deny the applicability of the offence, and 
the absence of any of which would confirm its commission. The creation of such a list 
by the Court would shift the focus away from the real issue in each case, which is 
whether there has been an offence under Article 368. Article 368 criminalises the 
promotion of consumption by others, and not the facilitation of personal consumption. 
Only forms of collective consumption that lack any structure for servicing third parties, 
akin to the facilitation of one’s own consumption, are excluded from the scope of the 
criminal law.88 A criminal offence will be committed where a system of cultivation, 
harvesting or acquisition of drugs is put in place with the objective of distributing it to 
third parties including where those third parties have been incorporated within a list, 
club or association and where the distribution is carried out on a not for profit basis.89 
Profit is one of many indicators that a supply exceeds the bounds of shared consumption 
and suggests ‘otherness’ (alteridad) but the absence of profit does not in and of itself 
make the behaviour one of shared consumption.90 
 
Whilst the concept of ‘third parties’ (alteridad) was not clarified and remains 
controversial, the Court did provide in the 2015 trio the following indicators of non-
criminal activity: a reduced number of persons gathered together on an informal basis 
in a closed circle, who know each other on account of the links and relationships 
between them and who are familiar with each other’s consumption habits to the extent 
that they can be more confident in their reasonable belief that the drug will not be re-
distributed or commercialized outside of their circle than would be the case from the 
mere imposition of a formal obligation for this not to happen.91 Other factors include 
the absence of any commercial spirit or profit; the absolute spontaneity and free, 
voluntary and informed nature of the decision of those who group together for this 
purpose, which in itself excludes the inclusion of underage persons.92  
The dissenting judgment in the Ebeers case (4 out of 15 judges) disagreed with 
the majority’s refusal to elaborate further on the criteria for establishing what conduct 
is outside the scope of Article 368: ‘on the contrary we believe it is our function to 
provide clear and assertive criteria to set the meaning of the law and we believe that in 
order to do this we need to depart from the doctrine of shared consumption and adapt 
it to the this social modality of consumption, signposting the circumstances in which it 
would be outside the scope of the criminal law by the means that least endanger 
liberty’.93The minority judgment opined that the majority’s refusal to elaborate on the 
criteria meant that the judgment failed to address the matter brought to it for resolution 
with clarity and instead perpetuated the uncertainty surrounding the conduct of 
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associations of cannabis consumers and thus facilitated arbitrary law enforcement. The 
minority judgment elaborated upon the criteria that associations should comply with in 
order to remain outside the criminal concept of ‘trafficking’ and in doing so its focus 
is, like the majority, on identifying what would and what would not endanger public 
health. In the minority’s opinion public health endangerment would be avoided where 
membership is restricted to adult and habitual consumers (in full possession of their 
self- governing faculties and already dedicated cannabis consumers) of some thirty 
persons (in order to ensure that they are known to each other and fixed in number) and 
where their conduct takes place on private premises (so as to avoid encouraging others).   
Legal scholar Juan Muñoz Sánchez (Muñoz henceforth) is the most prolific 
critic of the majority judgments and argues that the proven facts did not amount to an 
endangerment of public health on account of the association’s supply being restricted 
to club members and in the absence of any evidence of diversion to third parties, a 
category in which Muñoz claims it would be absurd to include private members and 
adult consumers of cannabis who have personally requested cannabis to be cultivated 
on their behalves.94 Muñoz purports to be in agreement with the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of law but to disagree with its application of the law to the facts.  Muñoz 
agrees that the essence of the criminal offence is the endangerment of public health and 
that it is in the absence of such endangerment that no criminal offence will have been 
committed.  Muñoz’s critique is not normative, but is restricted to debating the 
endangerment of the legal good protected. After emphasising the lack of any evidence 
to suggest that anyone other than members of the association was provided with 
cannabis, Muñoz elaborates on his reasons for disagreeing with the court’s finding of 
endangerment to public health by critiquing each of the three elements of the factual 
matrix in this case that the Court treats as indicative of public health endangerment: 
1. The incapacity of the association to control the risk of diversion of the drug to 
third parties including the risk of members providing the amounts supplied by 
the association to them to others.   
Muñoz takes issue with the relevance of the risk of members providing third 
parties with the cannabis on the basis that the amount supplied to each member is below 
the threshold amount stipulated in Spanish jurisprudence for  personal consumption. 
Muñoz asserts that the cultivation or storage of large amounts is insufficient in and of 
itself to amount to endangerment.  He supports his analysis of the level of risk thereby 
created by pointing to the existence of opium plantations authorised by Spain’s Ministry 
of Health and Consumer Affairs.  He concludes that the risk must therefore reside not 
in the fact of existence of a plantation or by the size of the amount stored, but in the 
measures of control applied to securing them against public access. 95 Although not 
pursued by Muñoz, the analogy he draws with national control measures for authorised 
production suggests a potential alternative source for the identification of public health 
endangerment, which is the international drug conventions themselves as it is these 
which guide the national control measures applied.  The conventions provide detailed 
control measures for the production and manufacture for medical and scientific 
purposes of scheduled substances.   Article 22 of the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, 1961  provides that the only circumstances in which a party is obliged to institute 
an outright prohibition on the cultivation of cannabis otherwise authorized by the state 
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is where the prevailing conditions in the country or the territory of a party to the 
convention are such that it would be the most suitable measure, in the opinion of that 
country, for protecting the public health and welfare and preventing the diversion of 
drugs into the illicit traffic. The UN’s official Commentary on the Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 suggests that this judgment is one for the individual party to 
make but envisages it being made where the Government reaches the conclusion that 
‘it cannot possibly suppress a significant diversion into the illegal traffic without 
prohibiting the cultivation of the plant.’96 The commentary elaborates on when this is 
likely to be the case:  
Any diversion is likely to cause harm to the health of human beings, but cultivation must be 
prohibited only if it is also necessary ‘for protecting the public health and welfare’. The additional 
condition appears to indicate that the authors of article 22 did not consider that any diversion whatever 
constitutes ipso facto a problem of public health and welfare including that of other countries but only 
one which is sufficiently large to present such a problem.  A Party is therefore not bound to prohibit 
cultivation if the drug in question is diverted only in relatively minor quantities.97  
Whilst Article 22 is only of application to cannabis cultivation authorized for 
medical or scientific purposes, its objective is the same as that of Spain’s Supreme 
Court in ensuring that cultivations are prohibited (in this case by the criminal law) 
wherever public health is endangered.  The divergence in approach between the UN 
commentary and Spain’s Supreme Court highlights limitations of public health 
endangerment as a normative concept. 
2. The establishment by an association of an institutionalized and permanent 
structure to supply cannabis to an indeterminate membership (on account of 
being open to additional members on an indiscriminate basis ) is likely in itself 
to endanger public health and the supply of cannabis to the members of such a 
body will thereby represent supply to third parties and so amount to a criminal 
offence. 
Muñoz’s first point of disagreement is with the court’s description of the 
membership approval process as indiscriminate given that members must satisfy 
various criteria as stipulated by the association including affirmation from the applicant 
that they are already a regular consumer of cannabis and are willing to comply with the 
rules of the association and provision of their identity documents.   Muñoz observes 
that openness to additional membership is integral to an association based on the shared 
interests of its membership body. Muñoz does not make this point in order to bring the 
right of association into play in his critique however, but instead to emphasise the 
normality of the conduct in question.  Finally, Muñoz takes issue with the Court’s 
suggestion that on account of the aforementioned characteristics of the association, 
supply to the members is akin supplying third parties.  Muñoz disputes this 
characterisation on the bases that (i) members are adult consumers of cannabis who 
have personally requested cannabis to be cultivated on their behalves and stipulated 
their monthly quotas when doing so and (ii) the association has means of verifying their 
identity. Héctor Brotons Albert (Brotons) also criticises the Supreme Court for 
deprecating the importance of the right to association by failing to evaluate the 
functioning of the associations in accordance with its registered constitution and the 
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democratic mechanisms prescribed in Law 1/2002 on the Regulation of the Right to 
Association98.  Brotons does not highlight the law regarding associations in order to 
suggest any breach of the right to association but to explain the Court’s ‘confusing’ 
equation of members with third parties to its failure to examine this aspect of the 
association’s conduct. 
Neither scholar addresses the Court’s discomfort with the continuous and 
permanent nature of the cannabis supply system established by the associations though 
it seems to me that it is this characteristic of the cannabis clubs that most markedly 
distinguishes them from the informal circumstances of social supply to which the 
doctrine of shared consumption continues to be applied.   I argue that the Court’s 
discomfort with the permanent structure, and its reluctance to provide clear guidance 
or criteria for distinguishing between collective cannabis cultivations which are 
criminal and those which are not, is best understood with reference to the principal 
objectives of the drug conventions.  The principal objectives of the drug conventions 
are generally understood to include the limitation of scheduled drug use to medical and 
scientific purposes99.  The general consensus, even amongst advocates of drug reform, 
is that any formal regulation of recreational cannabis supply would be in breach.100  The 
preoccupation of Spain’s Supreme Court with convention compliance is evident from 
its citation of the treaties and quotation from article 3 (1) (a) of the 1988 Convention. 
of the conduct a country is obliged to criminalise.  The Court did not quote the 
exceptions provided by article 3(2) for such conduct where it relates to personal 
consumption.  Neither did the Court note that parliament had relied upon this exception 
in its decision to retain personal consumption outside the remit of the criminal law. 
Indeed the author has been unable to locate any reference to this in any of the drugs 
literature on Spain.  The provision of detailed criteria on the distinction between 
criminal and non-criminal collective cannabis cultivation would not amount to the 
regulation of its supply so long as the criteria provided a means of providing much 
needed clarification of the distinction between ‘personal consumption’ and ‘drug 
trafficking’ in national law.   
3. The large number of members inscribed (290 persons) 
Muñoz asserts that the question of whether or not public health has been 
endangered is not of a quantitative nature.  A similar opinion was expressed in Judge 
Ferrer’s dissenting judgment in a later and similar decision on a cannabis association 
by the Supreme Court in 2016. 101  Both Muñoz and Ferrer emphasise the absence of 
public health endangerment where the supply is to a membership body constituted by 
adults in full possession of their self-governing faculties.  
Whilst noting the leeway provided to nation states in terms of how narrowly or 
expansively they define personal consumption in their national legislation, Spain’s 
Supreme Court expressed a concern that to deem Spain’s concept of personal 
consumption sufficiently widely to embrace a cannabis association supplying several 
hundred members would amount to such an extreme departure from the traditional 
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interpretation of the concept of personal consumption that a preliminary ruling would 
first need to be sought from the Court of Justice of the European Union on account of 
its doubtful compatibility with European norms. 102  
It is unfortunate that Spain’s Supreme court did not seek a preliminary ruling 
on this question for it is in fact far from clear that that a broad definition of personal 
use would constitute an extreme departure from international or European norms,  and 
it is arguable that any such departure might in any event be justified on the basis of the 
rights enshrined in human rights instruments. There is not scope in this article to explore 
the breadth and range of national definitions, suffice it to note for present purposes 
Spain is not alone in its inclusion of shared consumption (at least amongst a small 
number of friends) within the scope of personal consumption, and neither is it alone in 
doing so on the grounds that such conduct does not pose a significant threat to public 
health.103  
VII THE LIMITATIONS OF SPAIN’S PUBLIC HEALTH FRAMEWORK 
Spain’s application of the doctrine of legal goods reframes the distinction between 
‘trafficking’ and ‘personal consumption’ as one between conduct that endangers public 
health and conduct that does not. Spain’s Supreme Court developed the shared 
consumption doctrine as a tool for further refining this distinction. The weakness of the 
doctrines are that both the majority and the minority in the Supreme Court and the 
principal critic of the majority decisions all focus exclusively on the presence or 
absence of public health endangerment and reach different conclusions. The practical 
and theoretical limitations to the utility of the abstract concept of public health 
endangerment as the sole yardstick for determining the criminality of drug-related 
conduct have been illustrated by our analysis of the normative framework of cannabis 
clubs in Spain and the continued ambiguity surrounding their legal status. Criminal 
law, Philosophy and Public Practice marks an important contribution to the literature 
on public health protection in criminal law. Its contributors seeks to provide a varied 
examination of the conceptual, normative and practical implications of protecting 
public health through criminal law. 104 Several contributors to the volume explore the 
distinction between public and private from a deontological perspective. As Damon 
Barrett has pointed out, drawing a distinction between a human rights framework and 
a public health framework is not to suggest that the relationship between them is 
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antagonistic, in fact far from it.105 The two can complement each other in tailoring 
legislative responses.  The status of the cannabis club model is uncertain in Spanish law 
on account of the intractability of drawing clear boundaries around public health. 
Lawyer and legal scholar Héctor Brotons Albert is exceptional in criticizing the trio for 
failing to take the constitutional issue of human rights into account in reaching its 
judgment and for seeking instead to examine the issue of public health endangerment 
in a normative vacuum and without examination of the individual rights affected and 
the application of the proportionality test in relation to their breach.106  
We will now turn our attention to a growing body of comparative constitutional 
law in which recreational drug use is acknowledged as coming within the 
constitutionally protected realms of privacy and autonomy  
VII. PENAL PROVISIONS ON DRUGS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
FRAMEWORK 
In comparative constitutional case-law the freedom to consume cannabis in the 
absence of state interference has been consistently situated within the right to privacy 
and associated personality rights the objective of which is the protection of personal 
autonomy.  .107 The courts have reasoned that the right is exercised by the consumption 
of substances that produce experiences that in some way affect the thoughts, emotions 
and/or feelings of the person, for these are indeed amongst the most personal and 
intimate of activities.108  The crucial question under a human rights framework is the 
extent to which legal measures that interfere with autonomy (privacy/free development 
of the personality) can be justified as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate 
objective. The four stages of the justifiability test are (i) the legitimate goal stage, the 
purpose of which is to exclude impermissible goals such as perfectionism109, (ii) the 
suitability or rational connection which assess the suitability of the means for achieving 
the goal (iii) the necessity test which asks whether there is a less restrictive but equally 
effective means of achieving the goal and (iv) the balancing stage which involves the 
striking of a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the 
community.  
  Recent decisions by the Supreme Court of Mexico110 and the High Court of 
South Africa111 are particularly noteworthy on account of the rigour with which they 
apply the proportionality test. In the Mexican case the court, once having established 
                                                             
105 D Barrett, ‘A critique of human rights based approaches should demonstrate an understanding of human rights based 
approaches’ (2012) International Journal of Drug Policy 23 185-186. 
106 H Brotons Albert, ‘Principio de proporcionalidad’ in DP Martínez Oró Las sendas de la regulación del cannabis en 
España. 
107 In the United States of America: the Supreme Court of Hawaii in State v Kanter 493 F.2d 306 (1972) and the Alaskan 
decision Ravin v State 537 F.2d 494 (1975); in South America: the Constitutional Court of Colombia, Sentence No. C-
221/94, Constitutional Court Gazette 1994 Special Edition (available at www.drugtext.org/legal) as cited in N Boister, 
Penal Aspects of the UN Drug Conventions, (Kluwer Law International 2001) 125 n. 228, Supreme Court of Argentina (D 
Cozac, 'Rulings in Argentinian and Colombian courts decriminalize possession of small amounts of narcotics' (2009) 
HIV/Aids Policy & Law Review 14.2 as cited  in Eastwood et al., A Quiet Revolution, 13.), the Supreme Court of Mexico 
(2015) (Amparo appeal 237/2014, the Supreme Court of Chile (Ministerio Publico C/ Paulina Patricia Gonzàlez Cespedes 
R.U.C. Nº 1.300.243.332-4 R.I.T. Nº 14-2015, Rol 4949-2015 decided on 4 June 2015.); in Africa the High Court of South 
Africa in Prince and others v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and others (2017) ( Case No: 8760/2013 in 
the High Court of South Africa (Western Cape Division, Cape Town) 
108 Amparo appeal 237/2014 vi 
109 K Möller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (OUP 2012). See further Mattias Kumm, whom Möller identifies as 
the first author to link the philosophical idea of anti-perfectionism to proportionality-based rights analysis: M Kumm, 
'Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On the Place and Limits of the Proportionality Requirement’ in G 
Pavlakos (ed.), Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Hart Publishing 2007), 131 as referenced 
in Möller Kindle location 3400. 
110 Amparo appeal 237/2014 
111 Prince and others (2017) 
 23 
the engagement of a protected interest in the legislative measures pertaining to drug 
use, proceeded to the legitimate goal stage.  It identified the protection of public health 
and public order as the legitimate aims. The Court then proceeded to the suitability or 
rational connection stage, observing that the state’s measure would satisfy this if the 
measure could be shown to contribute in any extent and to any degree the legitimate 
purpose sought by the lawmaker.112 Interestingly, the court stated the impact of the 
policy on the number of persons consuming drugs was not the relevant question; the 
questions that needed to be asked were (i) what harm the consumption of cannabis 
posed to public health and public order and (ii) whether these were minimized by the 
measure. The Court found that the consumption of cannabis among drivers (i) increased 
the probability of vehicular accidents and the consumption amongst people more 
generally (ii) did pose a risk to health of consumers, but not an important risk since its 
permanent consequences are ‘unlikely, minimum or reversible’.  The court concluded 
that there was a rational connection between the measure and the legitimate goal in 
relation to (i) only.  At the necessity stage, the court noted that the measure had not 
reduced the number of consumers and had not therefore decreased harms related to its 
consumption. It noted that in relation to the effects on the health of consumers, 
educational and health measures, and prohibitions on advertisement, would provide 
adequate alternative measures, and noted that legal measures should discourage 
consumption in specific circumstances, such as driving. 113  It then moved on to the 
final balancing stage, and concluded that the measure was disproportionate.114 
A similar exercise and outcome was more recently conducted in Prince and others in 
the High Court of South Africa.115 Having acknowledged the intrusion on the right to 
privacy by the drug offences, the court ruled that the dispute would have to be 
determined in terms of the justification for limitation of privacy, with the burden resting 
on the state to satisfy this. The factors for consideration at this stage are set out in s.36 
of the South African constitution and are similar to those of the justifiability test 
outlined above: (i) nature of right (ii) importance of the purpose of the limitation; (iii) 
nature and extent of the limitation; (iv) relation between the limitation and its purpose; 
(v) availability of less restrictive means to achieve this purpose. The court observed 
that this limitation analysis ‘should be conducted through the prism of a court’s reading 
of the animating normative framework…in light of the values which underlie and open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.’116  
The court heard evidence on harms from all parties and concluded ‘the evidence 
as set out in this judgement supports the argument that the legislative response to 
personal consumption and use is disproportionate to the social problems caused as a 
result thereof’. The High Court accordingly ruled that the legislation needed to be 
amended to ensure that these provisions do not apply to those who use small quantities 
of cannabis for personal consumption in the privacy of a home as ‘the present position 
unjustifiably limits the right to privacy... The limitation on autonomy should in other 
words be narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose, […] it should be carefully focused 
or that it should not be overbroad’117 
 The human rights case-law on personal consumption approaches the 
demarcation between drug trafficking and personal consumption from the opposite 
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angle to the doctrine of legal goods, by starting with the question of what is private or 
what restricts a person’s autonomy. However the case-law goes no further than 
identifying the relevant right.  The focus of the judgements is on the extent to which 
interference with the right is justified. In other words, we are back to evaluating the 
endangerment to public health, albeit in a more nuanced and structured manner. 
Although several of the constitutional cases specifically restrict the engagement of the 
privacy right to ‘personal consumption’ the actual scope of ‘personal consumption’ is 
not addressed, with one exception. In the decision by the Supreme Court of Chile the 
concept of personal consumption (enshrined in the statutory exception to the 
commission of the offence) the Court held: 
[the term] does not necessarily imply that that the use or consumption of the substance obtained 
from the plant must be that of one sole individual, only that it is conducted solely and exclusively by the 
same people who sowed the seeds, planted, cultivated or harvested the plant that produced it, excluding 
thereby the use or consumption of third parties or others distant from such actions. 118 
The Chilean court’s interpretation of the statutory term is not based on any 
normative analysis of the scope of privacy however and it is only by exploring the scope 
of privacy that we can begin to sketch out the contours of a normative conception of 
personal consumption 
 
VIII. TOWARDS A NORMATIVE CONCEPTION OF PERSONAL 
CONSUMPTION? 
The concept of privacy in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) includes the right to establish and maintain relations with other human 
beings for the fulfilment of one’s personality and this extends to the right of association: 
The Court reiterates that ‘private life’ is a broad term encompassing the sphere 
of personal autonomy within which everyone can freely pursue the development and 
fulfilment of his or her personality and to establish and develop relationships with other 
persons and the outside.119 
In Niemitz v Germany the European Court of Human Rights stated: 
The Court does not consider it possible or necessary to attempt an exhaustive 
definition of the notion of ‘private life’. However, it would be too restrictive to limit 
the notion to an ‘inner circle’ in which the individual may live his own personal life as 
he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within 
that circle. Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to 
establish and develop relationships with other human beings. 120 
The North American theorist Bloustein has proposed an explicit link between 
individual privacy and the right of association. ‘The right to be let alone,’ he asserts, 
‘protects the integrity and dignity of the individual. The right to associate with others 
in confidence – the right of privacy in one’s associations – assures the success and 
integrity of the group purpose.’ He explains that: 
  [g]roup privacy is an extension of individual privacy. The interest protected by 
group privacy is the desire and need of people to come together, to exchange 
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information, share feelings, make plans and act in concert to attain their objectives…, 
group privacy protects people's outer space rather than their inner space, their 
gregarious nature rather than their desire for complete seclusion.121  
 
If we are to define ‘personal consumption’ as all that which pertains to the 
constitutionally protected realm of the private, it at least arguable that this should 
include collective cultivation and consumption by consumers in private.  
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Ambiguity surrounding the meaning of ‘personal consumption’ in the international 
conventions on drug control and in national legal systems is best decided within a 
human rights framework, particularly given the acknowledgement given to the 
engagement of constitutional principles by the term in the 1988 Convention. By 
examining the case-law from Spain, we can see that the normative strength of the 
Spanish public health framework is that it should exclude conduct which has no harmful 
impact on persons other than those engaged in it, and therefore, despite being an 
application of the Continental doctrine of legal goods, aligns its analysis with the 
objectives of the normative and liberal Anglo-American harm principle. Its weakness 
is that the law is uncertain and remains vulnerable to the same criticisms that have 
plagued the harm principle, primarily the perennial question of what can be said to 
constitute a harm (or in the Spanish context, what can be said to be harmful to public 
health).122  
 Whilst the application of human rights law to the recreational use of drugs 
remains controversial123 and there is still much to be resolved in the application of 
human rights law to recreational drug use, recent decisions by the Supreme Court of 
Mexico and the High Court of South Africa represent important advances in their 
rigorous application of the proportionality principle to legislative measures prohibiting 
drug use. The strength of the human rights framework is that it lends itself to a more 
nuanced approach whereby both the public health impact and the intrusion into privacy 
can be examined in tandem and the proportionality test applied to ensure that legislative 
measures achieve the correct balance between the two.  Whilst the case-law suggests 
that the decision of whether to consume drugs is a deeply personal one, the question of 
whether the same can be said of an organised system of collective cultivation and 
consumption is more complex.   Our review of the constitutional case-law has enabled 
us to identify autonomy as the value endangered and privacy as the right engaged to 
protect it. A brief analysis of case-law and theoretical literature on the scope of privacy 
more generally, suggests that the right to privacy does include social or ‘group’ privacy 
and that drug consumption in a social context could in certain circumstances come 
within the constitutionally protected realm of private life.    This could result in a broad 
conception of ‘personal consumption’ capable of embracing Spain’s cannabis clubs. 
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